Police Brutality in the Tenth Circuit: What Recent Federal Cases Mean for Utah Residents

When people talk about “police brutality,” they’re often talking about a moral judgment (“that was wrong”), a policy question (“how do we prevent it”), or a criminal-law question (“was it a crime?”). In civil federal court, though, the conversation usually narrows quickly into a technical question:

Did the officer’s conduct violate the U.S. Constitution (most often the Fourth Amendment), and can the officer be held liable despite qualified immunity?

That question matters for Utah residents because federal courts in Utah follow Tenth Circuit precedent (Utah, Colorado, Wyoming, New Mexico, Kansas, Oklahoma). And it matters even more when federal agents (ICE, FBI, DEA, U.S. Marshals, etc.) are involved, because the available legal claims can change dramatically.

A stark recent example of the “federal agent” wrinkle is the fatal shooting of Renee Nicole Good in Minneapolis(outside the Tenth Circuit). CBS News reports that the White House shared a new angle of cellphone video, and that a source identified the ICE agent who fired the shots as Jonathan Ross. The incident is being debated publicly in terms of “self-defense,” “use of force,” and accountability — the same themes that show up again and again in the Tenth Circuit’s excessive-force cases.

This post focuses on what the Tenth Circuit’s recent decisions say about:

1. how excessive-force claims are evaluated,

   
   

2. why qualified immunity often decides the case, and

   
   

3. which statutes/causes of action are actually available when the officer is a federal agent.

   
   

1. In federal civil cases, “police brutality” usually becomes a Fourth Amendment excessive-force claim

Most “brutality” lawsuits against state and local officers are brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which lets a person sue for constitutional violations committed “under color of” state law. The constitutional right most often litigated in use-of-force incidents during stops/arrests is the Fourth Amendment (unreasonable seizures).

Key practical point for Utah residents:

• If the officer works for a city, county, or state agency (police department, sheriff’s office, Utah Highway Patrol), § 1983 is usually the main vehicle.

  
  

• If the officer is a federal agent, § 1983 may not apply at all (more on that below), and the options become more limited and more technical.

  
  

2. The legal test: “objective reasonableness” (and why context dominates everything)

The Supreme Court baseline: Graham + Garner

For most force used during a seizure, courts apply the Supreme Court’s “objective reasonableness” standard from Graham v. Connor. The analysis looks at the totality of circumstances from the perspective of a reasonable officer on scene, not hindsight.

For deadly force, Tennessee v. Garner is the foundational Supreme Court framework: deadly force is judged under the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness requirement.

The Tenth Circuit emphasis: the “immediate threat” factor is often decisive

The Tenth Circuit repeatedly stresses that, among the Graham factors, immediate threat is the most important — especially in deadly-force cases.

This is one reason civil excessive-force cases can feel counterintuitive to non-lawyers:

• A situation can involve terrible outcomes, poor tactics, or tragic mistakes, and still not produce civil liability if the court concludes the officer reasonably perceived an immediate threat at the moment force was used — or if the law wasn’t “clearly established” enough to overcome qualified immunity.

  
  

3. Qualified immunity: why “clearly established law” is usually the real battleground

Qualified immunity is not a defense to “bad behavior” in general. It’s a doctrine that blocks damages unless the plaintiff can show both:

1. a constitutional violation, and

   
   

2. that the right was clearly established at the time — meaning every reasonable officer would have understood the conduct was unlawful in that specific context.

   
   

A short line that captures how protective qualified immunity can be appears in the Tenth Circuit’s Flores v. Hendersonopinion (quoting Supreme Court precedent):

“all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.”

That isn’t the court saying officers should be incompetent. It’s describing how forgiving the liability standard can be when the law is not crystal clear in factually similar prior cases.

4. Four recent Tenth Circuit opinions Utah residents should understand

Below are four published, recent Tenth Circuit decisions (2024–2025) that illustrate how the court is currently handling excessive-force cases — including shootings, pre-shooting “reckless creation,” and non-shooting force like police canines.

A. Flores v. Henderson (2024): “reckless creation” has limits when the threat is immediate

What happened: Officers responded to an extreme 911 scenario (reported deaths/hostages). They encountered information suggesting the subject might be unarmed and experiencing mental health issues, but the encounter rapidly escalated. The subject emerged with a machete and was shot.

The plaintiffs argued officers recklessly created the need to use deadly force — a Tenth Circuit concept that can, in some circumstances, make pre-shooting tactical choices part of the reasonableness analysis.

But the Tenth Circuit reversed the denial of qualified immunity, emphasizing the speed and danger of the threat:

“The officers had a split second to respond to a deadly threat ….”

Why Utah residents should care:Utah plaintiffs often focus (understandably) on what police “should have done differently” before shots were fired: wait longer, slow down, use cover, use less-lethal options, bring crisis responders, etc. Flores is a reminder that even if pre-shooting tactics are questioned, the court may still grant qualified immunity if the final threat moment is immediate, violent, and fast-moving — and if there isn’t closely on-point precedent clearly establishing liability for that pre-shooting conduct.

Evidence takeaway: Flores also shows how video/bodycam can reshape the “facts” used for the qualified-immunity analysis when a court concludes parts of one side’s narrative are contradicted by the record.

B. Estate of Waterhouse v. Direzza (2025): emergency conditions can change the threat calculus — even when the decedent is unarmed

What happened (high level): Officers confronted a barricaded individual in a basement who started a fire; smoke and chaos escalated. During evacuation, the subject burst out and rushed toward officers in a tight space. One officer fired and killed him.

The Tenth Circuit affirmed qualified immunity, emphasizing how environmental danger affected what a reasonable officer could fear:

“Given the fire and smoke, a wrestling match in the basement could have been fatal.”

The court also stressed the lack of controlling precedent forbidding lethal force in those circumstances.

Why Utah residents should care:In Utah, many high-stakes police encounters happen in confined environments: apartments, stairwells, basements, trailers, small rooms — and sometimes with fire, smoke, darkness, or multiple officers moving through bottlenecks. Waterhouse shows how courts may treat those conditions as amplifiers of threat, potentially making it harder to prove the use of deadly force was objectively unreasonable.

C. Ibarra v. Lee (2025): sometimes what happens before the shooting is exactly what defeats qualified immunity

What happened (high level): This case arose from the service of an emergency protective order and ended with a fatal shooting. The parties disputed who escalated the physical confrontation. The plaintiff’s version alleged belligerent provocation and beating that set up the final deadly encounter.

The Tenth Circuit framed the qualified-immunity question in a way every civil-rights lawyer should notice:

“qualified immunity turns on what happened before the shooting”

Ultimately, the court agreed that, on the plaintiff’s version of events (the version used at the qualified-immunity stage when supported by evidence), the constitutional violations were clearly established.

Why Utah residents should care:People often assume a shooting case is decided by the final seconds. Ibarra is a reminder that in the Tenth Circuit, pre-shooting conduct can be outcome-determinative when it’s framed as:

• unlawful arrest without probable cause,

  
  

• excessive force used to initiate/control the encounter, or

  
  

• escalation that “manufactures” the later threat.

  
  

Practical implication: If something goes wrong in a police encounter, the first minutes matter. Dispatch logs, initial commands, tone, physical positioning, and early uses of force can become the center of the civil case — not just the trigger pull.

D. Luethje v. Kyle (2025): prolonged canine force + home entry can be clearly unconstitutional

What happened (high level): Deputies responded to a report of a broken window, entered without a warrant, and used a police canine. The dog bit a person in bed, and the opinion describes that the deputies questioned him while the dog maintained its bite, then arrested him. He was not charged.

The Tenth Circuit affirmed denial of qualified immunity on multiple Fourth Amendment theories: unlawful entry/search, unlawful arrest, and excessive force, plus failure to intervene.

This case is vivid because it demonstrates how “brutality” is not only about shootings. It’s also about continued force after the person is compliant and the justification has evaporated — a category of claim the Tenth Circuit has repeatedly treated as clearly established in the right circumstances.

Why Utah residents should care:If you’re in Utah and a use-of-force incident occurs in a home (or after a suspect is already secured), Luethje is a strong example of how courts analyze:

• the sanctity of the home under the Fourth Amendment,

  
  

• the need for a warrant or a true exigency,

  
  

• and why prolonged force (including canine bites) can be unreasonable when compliance is evident.

  
  

5. What all of this means for Utah residents in real life

Here are the “street-level” implications of these cases:

1) Courts will ask: what threat did the officer reasonably perceive right then?

Cases like Flores and Waterhouse show how quickly courts can end the analysis if the threat is immediate and deadly (machete charge; rush in a smoke-filled basement).

2) But don’t ignore the lead-up — it can be the whole case

Ibarra highlights that pre-shooting conduct can control the outcome when it’s tied to unlawful arrest and escalating force.

3) Non-shooting force claims are real, and sometimes stronger

Luethje is a reminder that “excessive force” includes canines, holds, takedowns, tasers, and continued force after compliance.

4) Video and documentation are often decisive

The Tenth Circuit regularly discusses record evidence (bodycam, audio, etc.) and how it frames the “facts” for qualified immunity.

6. If the officer is a federal agent, what claims actually work?

This is where many people (understandably) get blindsided.

A. § 1983 is primarily for state/local officers — not federal agents

Section 1983 generally requires action “under color of” state law. Local police and sheriffs are the classic defendants. Federal agents (ICE, FBI, DEA, Marshals) are typically acting under federal authority, which means § 1983 may not fitunless unusual “joint action” or cross-deputization facts apply.

And even in joint task forces, the analysis can cut against § 1983. In Logsdon v. United States Marshal Service (2024), the Tenth Circuit describes “Special Deputy U.S. Marshals (Task Force Officers)” executing a warrant, and the court’s discussion reflects how federal-task-force status can shape what remedies exist.

B. Bivens claims (constitutional damages vs. federal agents) are now extremely limited

Historically, people used Bivens as the “federal version” of § 1983 for constitutional violations by federal officers. But modern Supreme Court doctrine has narrowed it sharply.

The Supreme Court in Egbert v. Boule reframed the inquiry to essentially ask whether Congress is better positioned to create a damages remedy — and the Court has been highly reluctant to allow new Bivens contexts.

The Tenth Circuit’s Logsdon opinion is unusually blunt about what that means in practice, quoting its own precedent applying Egbert:

“impermissible in virtually all circumstances.”

Translation: Even for serious alleged misconduct by federal officers, federal courts will often say: there is no Bivens cause of action here, especially if there’s any arguable “new context” or “special factors.”

So if you’re asking, “What can I sue a federal agent under for excessive force?” the uncomfortable answer is: the constitutional damages path is often blocked or heavily litigated.

C. The FTCA is often the most realistic damages pathway against the federal government

When federal agents are involved, many plaintiffs end up looking to the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), which allows suits against the United States (not the individual agent) for certain torts committed by federal employees acting within the scope of employment — after an administrative claim process.

Two FTCA concepts matter a lot in use-of-force cases:

1. Westfall Act substitution / exclusivity: federal employees are often immunized from state-law tort suits for acts within scope, with the U.S. substituted as defendant under the FTCA framework.

   
   

2. Law-enforcement proviso in 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h): for “investigative or law enforcement officers,” the FTCA can allow claims for certain intentional torts (commonly discussed as including assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process), depending on how the case fits the statute and state tort law.

   
   

FTCA limits to keep in mind (high level):

• procedural exhaustion requirements are strict,

  
  

• you’re suing the U.S. under state tort standards (varies by state),

  
  

• damages limits and immunity exceptions can apply,

  
  

• and the FTCA does not operate like § 1983 (it’s not a general “constitutional tort” statute).

  
  

D. What this means in a situation like the Renee Good shooting

Because the public reporting describes the shooter as an ICE agent, this is exactly the kind of situation where the “federal agent” problem appears: § 1983 may not apply in the straightforward way it would for a city police officer, and Bivens may face modern barriers — pushing families toward FTCA theories and/or other avenues.

To be clear: I’m not assessing the merits of that specific case here (facts are contested and investigations matter). The point is structural: federal-agent incidents often involve a different (and narrower) menu of civil claims than state/local incidents.

7. Bottom line for Utah residents

If you live in Utah and you’re trying to understand your rights when a police encounter turns violent, the recent Tenth Circuit pattern looks like this:

• Courts take the immediate-threat narrative very seriously (Flores, Waterhouse).

  
  

• But plaintiffs can still win at the qualified-immunity stage when the case is really about unlawful initiation/escalation and force used to “create” the final confrontation (Ibarra).

  
  

• “Police brutality” claims are not only shootings — prolonged or gratuitous force (including canines) can be clearly unconstitutional (Luethje).

  
  

• If federal agents are involved, the most important early question is often: Are we in § 1983 land, Bivens land, FTCA land, or some combination? — because the wrong choice can derail a case before facts are even reached.

Educational information only — not legal advice. If you need advice about a specific incident (especially involving serious injury or death), talk to a licensed attorney in your state as soon as possible.